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Wage Determination and 
Employment in Sweden Since the 
Early 1990s:
Wage Formation in a New Setting
Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
3.1    Introduction
Much of what is called the Swedish model has to do with Sweden’s labor 
market institutions, which are far diﬀerent than those of the United States. 
Simplifying only slightly, wage and employment outcomes in the United 
States are mainly the result of decentralized decisions by buyers and sellers 
of labor services. Less than 8 percent of American private-  sector workers 
belong to labor unions, while government intervention and participation in 
the labor market is comparatively small.1 Sweden represents the opposite 
extreme. In Sweden, over 80 percent of workers belong to labor unions. 
Thus, wages and working conditions for the vast majority of Swedes are 
the negotiated outcomes of collective-  bargaining agreements, which have 
had some uniquely Swedish characteristics that we describe next. And the 
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Swedish government is a major labor market actor. By 1990, the public 
sector accounted for one-  third of all jobs in Sweden, compared to only 15 
percent in the United States. The government also supports an extensive 
set of labor market policies and programs meant to maintain full employ-
ment while facilitating human capital formation and labor mobility. Last, 
Sweden’s large public sector implies high taxes on labor incomes—Swedish 
taxes are typically over half of gross domestic product (GDP), nearly double 
the share in the United States.
These features of the Swedish labor market evolved over roughly four 
decades, from the 1940s to the 1970s. And by the mid- 1970s, Swedes enjoyed 
one of the world’s highest living standards, along with the most egalitar-
ian income distribution of any advanced country. Poverty had been largely 
eliminated, and conventional measures of economic and labor market 
performance were enviable—the unemployment rate ﬂ  uctuated around 2 
percent, while average wage and productivity growth met or exceeded the 
average for developed countries.2 In concert with other welfare state policies, 
it appeared to many that the Swedish model of labor markets was an eﬀective 
mechanism for delivering long-  run prosperity and employment opportuni-
ties. It seemed the equity- eﬃciency trade- oﬀ was not so important—at least 
in Sweden.
Doubts began to emerge in the late 1970s. Sweden’s relative economic 
growth slowed, especially after 1975, while burgeoning welfare state institu-
tions greatly increased the tax burden on the typical worker. The ratio of 
wage costs to disposable (after taxes) income per hour worked exceeded 
4 to 1 in the 1980s—in fact, real disposable wages per hour worked did 
not grow at all from 1975 to 1993, in spite of rising pretax wages and pro-
ductivity.3 Nearly all employment growth after 1970 was due to the rapid 
expansion of public- sector jobs for women, which fueled rising female labor 
force participation. Private- sector employment stagnated. On the collective-
  bargaining front, large employers became progressively disillusioned with 
the redistributive and distortionary aspects of centralized bargaining, which 
had greatly compressed the wage distribution. The employers’ confedera-
tion abandoned its support for centralized bargaining in the 1970s, and the 
system began to unravel in 1983, when large industrial employers negotiated 
separate agreements with their unions.4
Concerns with the Swedish model peaked with the economic crisis of 
the 1990s. Buﬀeted by a perfect storm of international recession, a banking 
crisis, and unsustainable public spending—which had risen above 70 percent 
of GDP—both private and public employment fell. The employment rate 
2. See Lindbeck (2000) for a discussion.
3. On real wages and productivity, see Edin and Topel (1997, ﬁ  gure 4.5). On labor supply, see 
Burtless (1987) and Aronsson and Walker (1997).
4. We describe the evolution of centralized bargaining in greater detail next. The last central 
frame agreement was negotiated in 1987, though it seems to have had little eﬀect. The Swedish 
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of working- age Swedes declined by over 12 percentage points between 1993 
and 1997, a reduction in overall employment of about 500,000. Open unem-
ployment—which excludes jobless individuals enrolled in public retraining 
and other programs—reached nearly 10 percent. The Swedish labor market 
was no longer anyone’s envy. Both the present and the future of Swedish 
prosperity seemed at stake, along with faith in the Swedish model itself.
This chapter is a follow- on to the analysis of Edin and Topel (1997), which 
was written in the midst of the crisis. Edin and Topel analyzed the allocative 
eﬀects of labor market institutions and policies in Sweden over a period of 
roughly thirty years and drew implications for the future performance of the 
Swedish labor market. Among their conclusions were the following:
1.  Centralized bargaining and wage compression. Centralized bargaining 
had been an important contributor to wage compression, resulting in wage 
disparities that were smaller than what would have been generated by mar-
ket forces or even by decentralized collective bargaining. This compression 
had lasting eﬀects on the structure of the Swedish economy and labor mar-
ket: low- wage sectors and low- wage employers were priced out of existence, 
while large industrial employers of skilled labor were subsidized. For a time, 
artiﬁ  cially high wages for less-  skilled workers did not result in higher mea-
sured unemployment.
2.  Wage compression, taxes, and eﬃciency. The artiﬁ  cial compression of 
wage diﬀerences distorted incentives on many margins, aﬀecting decisions 
to work, to employ, and to invest in productive skills. These distortions were 
magniﬁ  ed by the large tax wedge generated by high income, payroll, and 
value-  added taxes. For skilled workers, the combined eﬀect of these taxes 
meant that take- home pay fell to only 21 percent of pretax wages, which were 
already artiﬁ  cially low. Of particular concern for long- run productivity, the 
private returns to investments in human capital—such as schooling—were 
unusually low. And low returns appeared to adversely aﬀect human capital 
investment.
3.  Labor market policies and the public sector. Much of Sweden’s large 
public sector is devoted to the maintenance of full employment. Yet, active 
labor market policies (ALMP) had little impact on unemployment or on 
subsequent productivities of participants. Although the rapid expansion 
of public-  sector jobs did not have much (direct) impact on the employment 
of men, the growth of the public sector helped raise and maintain the labor 
market fortunes of women—virtually all of the post- 1970 increase in wom-
en’s employment was due to the expansion of the public sector. Women’s 
wages and labor force participation converged toward those of men, in part 
because the public sector would employ whatever labor supply was forth-
coming at the chosen public-  sector wage.
If egalitarian policies raised the wages of the least skilled and displaced 
substantial employment, why didn’t those policies also generate widespread 
unemployment? Edin and Topel attributed part of the answer to the rapid 86        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
growth of public- sector employment, though that explanation did not seem 
especially satisfying for men. To resolve this puzzle, Edin and Topel con-
structed a simple model that rationalized the major facts about precrisis 
labor markets in Sweden—including wage compression, migration, and 
restructuring—along with the ultimate demise of centralized bargaining 
in the 1980s.
In their analysis, centralized bargaining and associated egalitarian poli-
cies delivered short-  run rents to skill-  intensive sectors. Consistent with the 
goals of Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) economists who had 
advocated wage compression in the 1960s, skill-   and capital-  intensive sec-
tors of the economy expanded, while low-  wage jobs were priced out of 
existence. Ineﬃciencies caused by distorted wage setting mounted over time, 
however. Sweden’s wage and income compression was swimming against the 
tide of technological changes that favored rising relative wages of skilled 
labor, so incentives to invest in skills were reduced at exactly the time that 
skilled labor became more valuable. The result was an ever-  worsening skills 
shortage, which impeded human capital formation and economic growth. In 
the longer run, it became progressively more diﬃcult for employers to hire 
skilled labor, precisely because skills were artiﬁ  cially cheap—which is what 
may have caused employers to ultimately reject centralized bargaining. For 
these and other reasons, Edin and Topel concluded that somewhat greater 
income inequality would have a ﬁ  rst-  order impact on economic eﬃciency 
and prosperity but only a minor impact on equity. In their view, a little more 
inequality would be a small price to pay for improvements in labor market 
performance.
We return to many of the same issues studied by Edin and Topel—but 
with the advantage of hindsight and the challenge of a greatly changed 
economic environment. We address two broad questions. First, how did 
Swedish policies and institutions adapt to the crisis? Second, were these 
adjustments and their eﬀects consistent with the earlier analysis of Edin 
and Topel?
With regard to the ﬁ  rst question, the central fact documented next is 
that economic forces, in general, and the crisis, in particular, have forced 
some relaxation of welfare state policies and constraints. The result is a 
move toward but not to decentralized market outcomes. The most promi-
nent symptom is that wage inequality increased substantially. Most of this 
increase occurred at the top of the wage distribution so that skill diﬀerentials 
among the most skilled increased. Among the least skilled and least edu-
cated, wage disparities did not increase much at all—negotiated wage min-
ima are still the rule in collective-  bargaining contracts—which apparently 
caused employment to take up the slack. With declining demand for less-
  skilled labor and increased supply from a surge in low-  skill immigration, 
relative employment rates of the least skilled fell sharply in the 1990s and 
did not recover.
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sector as a source of employment has diminished. In the 1980s, government 
jobs accounted for over 40 percent of all employment in Sweden, peaking 
at 43 percent in 1993. That fraction steadily declined thereafter, reaching 
about 35 percent in 2001. This evidently reduced overall labor demand; 
though private-  sector employment increased as part of the recovery, the 
employment- to- population ratio is roughly 8 points lower today than it was 
in 1990.
Are these outcomes consistent with the analysis oﬀered by Edin and 
Topel? At a broad level, we believe they are. Edin and Topel argued that 
welfare state institutions greatly aﬀected the employment and productivity 
landscape in Sweden. Skill diﬀerentials in wages and incomes were artiﬁ  -
cially compressed, which beneﬁ  ted employers of skilled labor for a time, 
but which produced ever-  increasing distortions, as (a) technical progress 
raised the demand for skilled labor, while (b) small returns to human capital 
investment discouraged Swedes from becoming skilled. Less- skilled workers 
beneﬁ  ted from the excess demand for skilled workers and from the growing 
public sector, so unemployment remained low. But market fundamentals 
eventually forced a retreat: the public sector shrank, taxes fell, and central-
ized bargaining gave way to more decentralized negotiations. The attendant 
rise in inequality was part of an overall move toward lower distortions, 
which improved eﬃciency, incentives, and economic performance.
The impact on egalitarian outcomes has been relatively minor, however. 
Even today, labor market outcomes in Sweden are the most egalitarian in 
the developed world, and unlike in the United States, postcrisis productiv-
ity increases have beneﬁ  ted both high-   and low-  wage workers. Given the 
modest increase in inequality that has occurred and its apparent beneﬁ  ts, 
Edin and Topel’s original conclusion may still apply: a little more inequality 
might go a long way—especially because one can reasonably argue that the 
eﬃciency price of a set of egalitarian policies is even greater today than it 
was in 1990.
The chapter is organized as follows. By way of background, section 3.2 
oﬀers a brief account of the setting. For a variety of reasons, wages in 
Sweden are set in a very diﬀerent environment today than twenty or thirty 
years ago. Section 3.3 documents the evolution of wage and employment 
diﬀerentials since the early 1990s. Section 3.4 addresses the link between 
wage policy and skill formation. In section 3.5, we turn to the other end of 
wage distribution and examine the link between the wage compression at 
the low end of wage distribution and the employment prospects of the less 
skilled. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2    The  (New)  Setting
A stylized description of the Swedish labor market in the 1970s and early 
1980s is as follows. More than 80 percent of Swedish workers were mem-
bers of labor unions so that wages and working conditions were largely 88        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
the result of collective bargaining. A key feature was that the negotiations 
were centralized—wages and working conditions were spelled out in cen-
tral frame agreements negotiated between the Swedish Employers’ Con-
federation (SAF) and the labor unions representing blue-  collar (LO), 
white-  collar (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees, or TCO), 
and professional (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, 
or SACO) employees. Centralized bargaining was the key institutional 
feature that promoted egalitarian outcomes; for example, between 1970 
and 1983, the log wage diﬀerence between blue-  collar workers in the 90th 
and 10th percentiles of the wage distribution fell by over 40 percent 
(Hibbs 1990).
Centralized bargaining started to crumble in 1983 when Verstadsförenin-
gen—which represented such large employers as ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB), 
Saab, and Volvo—negotiated outside the LO/  SAF frame and reached a 
separate agreement with the largest industrial union, Metall. This began 
a trend toward more decentralized wage setting, though still ﬁ  rmly within 
a framework of collective bargaining. There subsequently have been further 
changes to wage formation. Yet, unionization rates remain high, and collec-
tive bargaining features as prominently today as it did prior to the demise 
of centralized bargaining in the 1980s.
In 1980, about 10 percent of the working- age (twenty to sixty- four) popu-
lation was foreign-  born. The majority of immigrants (almost 60 percent) 
came from other Nordic countries, which have similar cultures and institu-
tions, and which are similarly developed (see Edin and Fredriksson 2000). 
About 15 percent of the Swedish working-  age population had a university 
degree, while 48 percent of the population had compulsory education. Years 
of completed schooling for the average Swede were lower than for the average 
American worker but higher than the EU average (Wasmer et al. 2007).
In the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden experienced its most severe macro-
economic shock since the Great Depression. Around the same point in time, 
Sweden entered the European Union, successfully curbed inﬂ  ation, reduced 
the government’s share of national output, and started to deregulate many 
markets. The educational attainment of the Swedish population continued 
to increase, and immigration ﬂ  ows, mainly driven by less-  skilled refugees 
from outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), reached postwar highs. This shift in the skill composition of 
immigrants has put further pressure on egalitarian wage policies: by 2003, 
non- OECD immigrants accounted for around 15 percent of low- wage work-
ers, which is roughly similar to the concentration of immigrants among 
low-  skilled workers in the United States.
It is fair to say that wages are set in a very diﬀerent environment today 
than twenty or thirty years ago. Our purpose in what follows is to describe 
this environment in greater detail. We begin with the macroeconomic set-
ting, followed by a description of changes in population and labor force Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    8 9
demographics. Finally, we describe the changes in the institutional setup for 
wage formation.
3.2.1      Aggregate Developments Since the Early 1990s
Beginning in the early 1990s, Sweden experienced its most severe eco-
nomic downturn since the 1930s. In just three years, (open) unemployment 
rose from 2 percent to almost 10 percent of the labor force.
The crisis of the early 1990s is readily visible in ﬁ  gure 3.1, which illus-
trates the evolution of the employment-  to-  population ratio among sixteen-   
to sixty-  four-  year-  olds from 1976 to 2004. After rising steadily from the 
1970s to 1990, the ratio dropped by more than 10 percentage points between 
1990 and 1992 (from 83.1 percent in 1990 to 72.6 percent in 1992). Employ-
ment continued to decline until 1997—the overall peak-  to-  trough decline 
in the employment rate was about 12 percentage points—and since then 
has recovered only slightly. Even after fourteen years, by 2004, the overall 
employment rate remained more than 8 percentage points below its 1990 
peak. This fact alone may suggest that the very high employment rates of 
the late 1980s were untenable.
The shock of the early 1990s hit the manufacturing sector ﬁ  rst, leading to 
a decline in private-  sector employment that began in 1990. Manufacturing 
employment fell by 240,000 jobs between 1989 and 1993—a decline of 26 
percent. Figure 3.2 shows that the ratio of overall private- sector employment 
to the working-  age population fell by about 7 percentage points between 
1990 and 1993. More permanent cutbacks in the size of the public sector 
followed: the public employment- to- population ratio fell from 31 percent to 
23 percent between 1990 and 1997—a decline of 26 percent—and did not 
subsequently rebound. Notice that the overall decline in the employment-
 to- population ratio—shown in ﬁ  gure 3.1—is mainly due to the contraction 
of the public sector. Private- sector employment as a share of the population 
returned to its precrisis level. The public share of total employment thus 
has ratcheted down, and with it has gone the impact of the welfare state 
on overall labor demand.5 The Swedish private sector accounted for just 
more than half of total employment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
By 2004, the private-  sector share had increased to nearly two-  thirds. In this 
respect, the developments of the 1990s are very diﬀerent than in the pre-
ceding two decades, when the public share of total employment steadily 
increased, accounting for virtually all of net job creation between 1970 and 
1990 (Edin and Topel 1997; Rosen 1997).
An important macroeconomic development is that Sweden successfully 
curbed inﬂ  ation during the 1990s. From 1971 to 1990, annual inﬂ  ation 
5. Some of the decline in the public sector is due to the privatization of some public-  sector 
activities. The decline in the share of public employment to total employment is certainly real, 
however. Even under the extreme assumption that the entire decline in the public sector is due 
to privatization, this would only account for half the increase in the private sector.90        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
averaged 8.5 percent. In 1990, the rate of change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) reached 10.5 percent, its highest level since 1980/  1981. It fell sharply 
during the crisis years and has averaged just 1.3 percent since 1994. As can 
be seen in ﬁ  gure 3.3, despite relatively solid employment growth between 
1998 and 2001, since 1994, inﬂ  ation has generally remained within the bands 
Fig. 3.1    Employment rate among sixteen-   to sixty-  four-  year-  olds, 1976 to 2004 (%)
Source: Labor force surveys.
Fig. 3.2    Private-   and public-  sector employment, 1987 to 2004 (%)
Source: Labor force surveys.Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    9 1
stipulated by the central bank’s inﬂ  ationary target (2  1 percent), with the 
only exceptions occurring when inﬂ  ation was below 1 percent in 1996 to 2000 
and in 2004 to 2005. This low- inﬂ  ation regime was presumably achieved via 
a combination of a more restrictive monetary policy—implemented by an 
independent central bank—a rapid worsening of labor market conditions, 
and possibly of more wage coordination in national level negotiations.
Labor productivity grew faster during the 1990s than during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Between 1992 and 2003, labor productivity grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.5 percent (see ﬁ  gure 3.8). In part, this upturn of productiv-
ity growth reﬂ  ects the cleansing eﬀects of the recession, which forced the 
least productive plants to close and compelled the recovery from the depths 
of recession. Yet, the steady pace of productivity growth also indicates real 
improvements in economic performance and growth. Using (precrisis) 1991 
as a base, real GDP per capita grew by 27.6 percent between 1991 and 2004, 
nearly identical to per capita income growth in the United States over this 
period (27.7 percent).6 As we shall see, this growth was far more equally 
distributed in Sweden than in the United States, where productivity gains 
accrued almost exclusively to high-  wage earners.
On top of these developments, Sweden’s integration in world labor and 
product markets continues. Some would argue that this development favors 
a widening of wage diﬀerentials, as technical progress has favored more 
skilled labor, and globalization has increased the relative supply of goods 
produced by low- skilled foreign labor (see Leamer, chapter 9 in this volume). 
Fig. 3.3    Rate of inﬂ  ation, 1980 to 2004 (%)
Source: Statistics Sweden.
6. OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden (2005).92        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
These pressures likely are exacerbated by reduced barriers to international 
migration, because a generous welfare state may be more attractive to the 
less skilled, while talented Swedes may seek their fortunes abroad. We return 
to these points later.
3.2.2      Changes in Population Characteristics Since the Early 1990s
Wage dispersion and employment outcomes depend on the characteristics 
of the underlying population, for two reasons. First, by construction, wage 
dispersion will be greater when the skills of the working population are 
more heterogeneous. Second, changes in the shares of diﬀerent skill catego-
ries aﬀect relative wages for the usual factor-  proportions reasons—absent 
the conditions for strict factor price equalization, a reduction in the share 
of less-  skilled workers will raise their relative wage, and so on. On the ﬁ  rst 
point, data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) indicate 
that countries with greater inequality of skills also have greater wage disper-
sion (e.g., Nickell and Layard 1999; and Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van Ophem 
2004). On the second, changes in within-  country factor proportions aﬀect 
within- country relative wages, contrary to what one would expect in a simple 
factor price equalization model of wage determination (Topel 1997).
Compared to the United States, the Swedish population was relatively 
homogenous in the beginning of the 1990s. An indication of this is that the 
variance of measured skills in the IALS was substantially lower in Sweden 
than in the United States. But the heterogeneity of the Swedish population 
arguably has increased. The most obvious indication of this is that immi-
gration surged dramatically, primarily during the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s. 
At a superﬁ  cial level, the importance of immigrants in the Swedish labor 
force does not appear much diﬀerent than in the United States. The share 
of immigrants in the Swedish population in 2003—see table 3.1—is similar 
to what one ﬁ  nds for the United States; as of 2003, 13.5 percent of the 
working-  age population was foreign-  born. Moreover, the increase since 
the early 1990s—almost 3 percentage points—is also comparable to the 
U.S. experience. But Sweden experienced an important and rapid shift in 
the source countries of new immigrants during the 1990s. In 1992, Nordic 
and non-  OECD immigrants each accounted for 4.7 percent of the Swedish 
population. But by 2003, non- OECD immigrants accounted for 8.7 percent 
of the population, more than double the (declining) share of Nordic immi-
grants. Non-  OECD immigrants now account for nearly two-  thirds of the 
immigrant population, but they made up less than half a decade ago. As a 
share of immigrant inﬂ  ows, these changes in the stock of immigrants imply 
a very large shift toward non-  OECD immigrants. On average, the skills of 
these new immigrant groups are less apt to the Swedish labor market, which 
puts greater pressure on redistributive policies.
Continuing previous trends, educational attainment in the Swedish popu-
lation increased substantially during the 1990s; see table 3.2. From 1992 to Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    9 3
2003, the share of the population with more than twelve years of school-
ing increased by 9 percentage points, as younger, more-  educated cohorts 
replaced older, less- educated cohorts. At the other end of the schooling dis-
tribution, there is thus a mirror decline in the share of the population with 
compulsory schooling (or less).
These changes in the composition of the working-  age population have 
implications for the eﬀects of wage policies and labor market institu-
tions. The decline in the share of less-  educated labor relaxes market pres-
sures for low wages among the least skilled so that redistributive wage 
policies may distort less, other things being the same.7 In this context, 
the contraction of public-  sector employment in the mid-  1990s, which 
increased the importance of private-  market outcomes, probably had less 
impact on inequality and employment than would have occurred in the 
1970s or 1980s. Yet, the rising share of refugee immigrants in the Swed-
ish population, together with technical progress that has favored skilled 
Table 3.1  Immigration
Immigrant share, population aged 
eighteen to sixty-  four (%)
  Year  Total   Nordic   OECD   Non- OECD  
1992 10.8 4.7 1.5 4.7
1997 12.3 4.0 1.3 6.9
  2003  13.5   3.4   1.4   8.7  
Source: Calculations based on Longitudinal INdividual DAta (LINDA); see Edin and Fred-
riksson (2000).
Table 3.2  Educational attainment
Year  Schooling  9 years  Schooling 9–12 years  Schooling  12 years
Population aged to eighteen to sixty-  four (%)
1992 27.5 49.9 22.6
1997 23.9 49.6 26.5
2003 19.2 49.2 31.6
Population aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four (%)
1992 28.4 46.7 24.9
1997 23.5 48.2 28.3
2003  17.9   48.5   33.7
Source: Calculations based on LINDA; see Edin and Fredriksson (2000).
7. If changes in the skill composition of the labor force have not kept pace with technical and 
other changes in the skill composition of demand, then the distortions caused by redistributive 
policies may have increased.94        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
labor, is an opposite force that poses a challenge to Sweden’s egalitarian 
goals.
3.2.3    Institutional  Changes
Given the substantial changes in the environment, it perhaps would have 
been surprising if wage- setting institutions had not changed as well. In some 
important ways, the institutional setup is indeed diﬀerent than during the 
preceding decades.8 As we will describe next, there was both more coordina-
tion and more decentralization in wage setting. Yet, collective-  bargaining 
agreements and unions appear to be as important in the Swedish labor mar-
ket as they have been historically. Union density remained unchanged during 
the 1990s, and the prominence of collective agreement remains in place in 
labor legislation.9
The crisis years of the early 1990s saw an interlude, however. After central-
ized bargaining was largely abandoned in the 1980s, there was a temporary 
reversion of wage bargaining to a highly centralized level. A stabilization 
drive in 1990 resulted in a government- appointed commission that delivered 
a proposal for wage restraint during 1991 through 1993. The proposal was 
ﬁ  nally accepted after negotiations with over one hundred organizations. 
Wage inﬂ  ation fell from over 10 percent per annum in the late 1980s to 4 
percent in 1992 and to 2 to 3 percent in 1993 to 1994.
The years that followed involved a return to the largely decentralized 
wage bargaining at the industry level of the 1980s. But in 1997, a new regime 
emerged. The so- called industrial agreement (IA) was struck between unions 
and employers in the manufacturing sector. This agreement involves a set 
of procedural rules for labor negotiations, similar in many ways to the laws 
that govern collective bargaining in the United States. It stipulates, inter alia, 
timetables for negotiations and rules for conﬂ  ict resolution, and it gives a 
prominent role for mediators to resolve disputes. The IA model has been 
followed by similar agreements in other sectors of the economy. By 2002, 
almost 60 percent of the labor force was covered by IA-  type agreements 
(Elvander 2003).
While the IA model may have delivered incentives for wage restraint at the 
aggregate level, it is reasonable to think that it has had a minor inﬂ  uence on 
the wage structure. The agreement seems to have resulted in fewer instances 
of industrial action in comparison with 1993 to 1997. Nevertheless, it only 
establishes a set of procedural rules of the game. While there is a bargain 
struck at the national level, in general, the negotiated wage increases only 
come into operation should there be disagreement at the local level.
The wage structure probably is inﬂ  uenced more by another institutional 
change in wage formation—a substantial move toward the decentralization 
8. This section builds on Holmlund (2003).
9. Union density stood at 80 percent in 1990 and 79 percent in 2000 (OECD 2004).Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    9 5
of wage negotiations. This started in the beginning of the 1990s, when some 
central agreements for white-  collar workers in the private sector contained 
neither total wage increases nor minimum wage increases. It was entirely up 
the employer and the employee to determine the wage increase (see Lindgren 
2005). The pace of decentralization has varied by sector and worker cat-
egories. Many central wage agreements specify a fall-  back wage increase, 
in case there is disagreement at the local level, and a minimum guaranteed 
wage increase for each individual. In table 3.3, we outline the wage agree-
ment modes that existed in the Swedish labor market in 2004. As the table 
illustrates, a wide variety of wage-  setting practices exists in the Swedish 
labor market today.
In table 3.3, we have ordered the models with respect to the inﬂ  uence 
given to the local bargaining parties. So, model 1 has complete freedom for 
the local parties, while there is no local inﬂ  uence in model 7. Thus, rows (1) 
through (3) indicate that 36 percent (18  4  14) of employees are covered 
by agreements where local bargaining determines the local, employee- speciﬁ  c 
wage increase (in some cases subject to the restriction that individuals are 
guaranteed some minimal wage increase); another 47 percent are covered by 
agreements where the local parties determine the allocation of a given wage 
increase (the wage frame). An additional 10 percent have local bargaining 
with some inﬂ  uence on the distribution. Finally, 7 percent have their wages 
set by the central agreement. Interestingly, all of the agreements where there 
is no local inﬂ  uence over the size and allocation of wage increases can be 
Table 3.3  Wage agreement modes
Employees (%)
Model   All  Private  
Central 
government   Local public
1. Local bargain without restrictions 18 7 38 28
2. Local bargain with a fallback 4 8 0 0
3. Local bargain with a fallback plus a 
guaranteed wage increase
14 16 62 0
4. Local wage frame without a guaranteed 
wage increase
30 12 0 72
5. Local wage frame with guarantee or a 
fallback regulating the guarantee
17 28 0 0
6. General pay increase plus local wage frame 10 18 0 0
7. General pay increase   7   11   0   0
Source: National Mediation Oﬃce (2004).
Notes: A fallback means that the central agreement speciﬁ  es a general wage increase that 
comes into operation should the local parties not agree. A guaranteed wage increase means 
that each individual is guaranteed a wage increase of a certain amount of Swedish krona 
(SEK). A local wage frame means that the local parties are given a total wage increase but can 
decide on the distribution of that increase over individuals.96        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
found in the private sector, which now accounts for about two-  thirds of 
employment. In fact, in the public sector, previously rigid wage schedules 
were abandoned in the mid-  1990s. In theory, wages are determined locally 
in the entire public sector, and there is considerable leeway for employers to 
tailor wages so that they can recruit and retain employees.
Many central bargains are still binding when it comes to the lower tail 
of the wage distribution, however. Wage settlements for blue-  collar work-
ers involve centrally determined minimum wages, and some 40 percent of 
employees are covered by agreements that guarantee each individual a cer-
tain pay increase. In general, wage determination for white- collar workers is 
subject to fewer restrictions than for blue-  collar workers (National Media-
tion Oﬃce 2004).
3.3      Changes in Wage and Employment Diﬀerentials
With the changes in the environment and institutions as a background, 
we now proceed to document the changes in the wage structure and employ-
ment that have occurred since the early 1990s, with particular emphasis on 
wage dispersion and employment diﬀerentials across skill groups.10
3.3.1      Changes in Wage Diﬀerentials
Figure 3.4 summarizes some basic facts about the evolution of the wage 
distribution since the early 1990s, based on individual data recorded in the 
Longitudinal INdividual DAta (LINDA) panel survey. The solid line shows 
the standard deviation of log wages; the dotted line graphs wage dispersion 
within industries, while the dashed line corresponds to the residual log wage 
distribution after controlling for experience, education, gender, immigrant 
status, and years since migration.11
The basic fact is that wage inequality increased. The raw standard devia-
tion of log wages increased from 0.25 in 1992 to 0.30 in 2003. This increase 
occurred both within industries (the dotted line) and within worker catego-
ries (the dashed line). The fact that residual wage inequality is uniformly 
lower than overall but that it increased by the same amount indicates that 
virtually all of the increase in wage inequality was due to changes in the 
returns to unmeasured characteristics of workers.
Figure 3.5 examines wage diﬀerentials between individuals at various per-
centiles of the wage distribution. The solid line shows a steady increase in the 
10. There of course are other relevant papers on this; see, for example, Gustavsson (2004), Le 
Grand, Szulkin, and Tåhlin (2001), and Nordström, Edin, and Homlund (2006).
11. The numbers presented in this section come from the wage data contained in LINDA; 
see Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for a description of these data. In the pre-  1998 data, there is 
stratiﬁ  ed sampling by ﬁ  rm size in the private sector. We correct for this by weighting, using the 
inverse of the sampling weights at the industry level. We describe this procedure—and other 
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ratio of the wage at the 90th percentile of the overall wage distribution 
to the wage at the 10th percentile—the 90/  10 ratio. This ratio increased 
by some 15 log points between 1992 and 2001. Put diﬀerently, in 1992, 
the wage of an individual at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution 
was about 73 percent higher than that of a worker at the 10th percentile 
(exp(0.55)  1.73). By 2003, the 90th-  percentile wage was over double 
Fig. 3.4    Overall and residual standard deviation of log wages
Source: Calculations based on LINDA.
Fig.  3.5  Wage  diﬀerentials at diﬀerent points in the wage distribution, 1992 to 
2003
Source: Calculations based on LINDA.98        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
the 10th-  percentile wage (exp(0.70)  2.01). The dashed and dotted lines 
decompose the 90/  10 wage diﬀerential into 90/  50 and 50/  10 components, 
respectively. The increasing spread of the wage distribution was pervasive, 
in the sense that both the 90/  50 and 50/  10 gaps widened. However, as in the 
United States, most of the increase occurred in the upper half of the wage 
distribution—the 90/ 50 ratio rose by about 10 log points from 1992 to 2001, 
accounting for two-  thirds of the change in the 90/  10 ratio. The widening of 
wage diﬀerentials appears to have stopped in 2001.
Despite the trends in ﬁ  gures 3.4 and 3.5, it is still the case that there is far 
less inequality of wages and incomes in Sweden than in the United States. 
In 2003, after roughly two decades of rising inequality in Sweden, the ratio 
of wages at the 90th and 10th percentiles stood at about 2.01. By compari-
son, the 90/  10 wage ratio in the United States was about 5.5—over twice 
the Swedish ratio. In other words, by any measure, wage inequality in the 
United States dwarfs inequality in Sweden. This suggests that rising wage 
inequality in Sweden has some distance to go before it would be considered 
a meaningful threat to egalitarian ideals. Yet, the rise in inequality in Sweden 
is important—at least by Nordic standards.
We noted earlier that the trend toward decentralized bargaining has been 
more pronounced among white- collar workers than among blue- collar work-
ers. In ﬁ  gure 3.6, we show that wage dispersion increased the most among 
white-  collar workers. By 1992, the 90/  50 diﬀerential among white-  collar 
employees had regained its 1970 value, and it has remained above that level 
since. Compared to 1970, the only meaningful change in within-  category 
relative wages occurred among low-  wage white-  collar workers, for whom 
Fig. 3.6    Wage dispersion by worker category in the private sector, 1970 to 2004
Source: Private-  sector wage data reported in Lindgren (2005).Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    9 9
inequality declined sharply between 1970 and 1980. Among blue-  collar 
workers, inequality is uniformly lower, as skill heterogeneity itself is likely 
narrower for this group. Notice that increasing blue-  collar wage diﬀerences 
since 1985—soon after the collapse of centralized bargaining in 1983—have 
brought within-  group inequality full circle since 1970, continuing the trend 
noted by Hibbs (1990) and Edin and Topel (1997, ﬁ  gure 4.2). The data in 
ﬁ  gure 3.6 pertain to the private sector, but the analysis in Lundborg (2005) 
shows that these conclusions are also valid for the economy as a whole.
Rising wage inequality in Sweden is a much- dampened reﬂ  ection of what 
has occurred elsewhere since about 1980, especially in the United States and 
United Kingdom (e.g., Katz and Autor 1999). Figure 3.7 shows the evolu-
tion of wage inequality in the United States since 1980; the 90/ 10 wage ratio 
increased by about 30 log points. In 1980, workers at the 90th percentile of 
the U.S. distribution earned roughly four times the wages of those at the 
10th percentile. By 2000, that ratio had risen to 5.5. By comparison, even 
after a nearly twenty-  year secular in wage inequality, the corresponding 
ratio in Sweden stood at 2.01, or roughly half the 1980 level of inequality 
in the United States.12
The U.S. workforce is far more heterogeneous than that of Sweden, 
so direct comparison of inequality measures is problematic—few would 
claim that Sweden would have U.S. wage outcomes if it adopted American 
labor market institutions, or conversely. Other Nordic countries provide an 
alternative benchmark, albeit with similar wage-  setting institutions. Nor-
dic countries share the feature of having very low wage inequality. In Fin-
land, nothing seems to have happened to inequality during the 1990s. Using 
annual earnings of full-  time employees as a wage measure, the log of the 
90/  10 wage ratio in Finland was 0.91 in 1990—comparable to Sweden but 
well below most other developed countries. By 2003, this ratio was virtually 
unchanged (0.89).13 It is noteworthy that there have been no institutional 
changes in wage formation since 1990 in Finland; industry bargaining has 
prevailed throughout the time period.14 Norway provides another Nordic 
benchmark. In 1990, the log of the 90/  10 ratio among full-  time working 
employees stood at 0.88. By 2002, the ratio stood at 0.90. And as in Finland, 
there have been no changes in the institutional setup of wage bargaining in 
Norway.15
Around 1990, the return to education was relatively low in Sweden—it aver-
aged about 5 percent per additional year of education. This was somewhat 
12. According to the OECD (2004), earnings dispersion around the turn of the century is 
low in Sweden compared with other OECD countries. (It is comparable to countries such as 
Finland, Italy, and Norway.) But the change in dispersion from the late 1980s to the early 2000s 
is greater than in the United Kingdom.
13. In 2003, the log of 90/  10 earnings ratio (deﬁ  ned analogously) stood at 0.93 in Sweden.
14. Thanks to Roope Uusitalo for supplying this information.
15. We thank Kjell Salvanes for supplying this information.100        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
lower than in other developed countries and well below the estimated returns 
to schooling in the United States, where average Mincerian returns to an 
additional year of schooling had reached about 14 percent by 1990—nearly 
three times the Swedish return. Over the ensuing decade, the U.S. return 
stayed roughly constant, while returns in Sweden rose slightly. This is illus-
trated in table 3.4, which reports standardized wage diﬀerentials by observed 
characteristics at successive points in time. The estimates are obtained from 
wage regressions that were run separately for each year shown. Explana-
tory variables include schooling (sometimes splined), potential experience 
(dummies for each ﬁ  ve-  year interval), gender, immigrant status (separate 
dummies for Nordic, OECD, and non- OECD immigrants), and years since 
migration (dummies for each ﬁ  ve-  year interval).
Though most of the increase in wage dispersion occurs within groups 
deﬁ  ned by observable characteristics, there is some action in the returns to 
those characteristics, as well. The ﬁ  rst row in the table shows that the return 
to education increased by 1.5 points (roughly 30 percent) over the 1990s. 
The returns to an additional year of schooling at the university level has 
been consistently higher than the return at lower levels, and it has increased 
more since the early 1990s. This, too, oﬀers a contrast to the United States, 
where returns per year are roughly equal across schooling levels. This may 
be further evidence that Swedish wage-  setting institutions have a relatively 
larger impact among the least skilled. As previously shown, wages are more 
compressed among less-  skilled workers than among more-  skilled ones.
Fig. 3.7    Log of the 90/  10 ratio in the United States, 1980 to 2000
Source: Calculations based on the Current Population Survey (CPS)Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    1 0 1
Table 3.4 also shows that there is a minor increase in the return to expe-
rience, as measured by the gap between new entrants and peak earners, 
and that the male-  female wage gap has remained fairly constant. Wage 
diﬀerences among Nordic and OECD immigrants have remained small, 
presumably reﬂ  ecting their similarity to native Swedes. The story is diﬀerent 
for non- OECD immigrants, for whom relative wages fell by about 4 percent-
age points over the decade.
The upshot of the facts presented here is that skill premiums for observed 
measures of skill, as well as residual wage inequality, increased during the 
1990s. But why? Given the institutional setting and evidence on driving 
forces in other countries, two explanations are plausible. The ﬁ  rst is skill-
  biased technical change that has raised the relative productivity of those 
with greater skills. The second is the decentralization of wage bargaining, 
which may facilitate the impact of technical change. We think the evidence 
favors a combination of these forces, with greater weight on changes in the 
institutional features of wage formation. The reasons are twofold. First, 
nothing much has happened to wage dispersion in Norway and Finland; 
in these countries, there were no changes to the institutional setup of wage 
bargaining, and they arguably were exposed to the same forces of technical 
change as in Sweden. Second, we see the greatest increase in wage dispersion 
among white-  collar workers in Sweden, and it is for this group of workers 
that the changes in the institutional features of wage formation have been 
most pronounced.16 Yet, technology-  driven changes in the value of skills 
Table 3.4  Log wage diﬀerentials by observed characteristics
Year
    1992   1996   2000   2003
Additional year of schooling (s)
  Average 0.049 0.052 0.061 0.064
  s  12 0.030 0.031 0.038 0.038
  s  12 0.066 0.068 0.077 0.079
New entrants (relative to peak wage earners) –0.242 –0.286 –0.270 –0.276
Women (relative to men) –0.165 –0.182 –0.181 –0.167
Immigrants by region of origin (relative to 
native born)
  Nordic –0.001 0.005 0.005 –0.002
  OECD –0.034 –0.023 –0.023 –0.019
  Non-  OECD   –0.050   –0.068   –0.085   –0.091
Note: New entrants row pertains to those with zero to ﬁ  ve years of potential experience rela-
tive to those with thirty to thirty-  ﬁ  ve years of potential experience.
16. Moreover, direct observation on segments of the labor markets where there were distinct 
changes in the wage-  setting institutions are consistent with the conclusion that change in the 
institutional setup is a major factor driving the increase in wage inequality (see Söderström 
2006; and Granqvist and Regnér 2006).102        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
may have played an important role in this. The evidence from the United 
States is that wage inequality and returns to education and experience grew 
rapidly during the 1980s, while these eﬀects were greatly dampened in Swe-
den. The fact that inequality in Sweden increased during the 1990s can be 
interpreted as Swedish wage-  setting institutions delaying the tide of rising 
inequality caused by the increased value of skills.
3.3.2    Employment  Diﬀerentials
We now turn to the evolution of employment outcomes for diﬀerent 
groups.17 Table 3.5—which has the same structure as table 3.4—shows stan-
dardized diﬀerences in employment rates by observed characteristics.
The ﬁ  rst two rows show employment diﬀerentials by education. For those 
with compulsory schooling or less, the contraction of the early 1990s caused 
a sharp and apparently permanent decline in relative employment oppor-
tunities. The fact that the university educated also lost ground relative to 
upper-  secondary graduates is more surprising. But recall from section 3.2 
that this period corresponded to a large increase in the relative supply of 
university-  educated workers, which was likely a contributing factor.
The experience of non-  OECD immigrants suggests a similar interpreta-
tion: their employment prospects have not recovered fully from the 1990s 
contraction, which was likely exacerbated by the large inﬂ  ux of refugee 
immigrants during the same time period. Perhaps contrary to expectations, 
the contraction of the public sector did not cause a decline in the relative 
employment rate of women. Instead, a secular pattern of increased female 
employment (relative to men) continued through the decade.18
3.3.3      Wages and Employment by Skill Group
In this section, we address the question of how wages and employment 
have evolved for diﬀerent skill groups since the early 1990s. Our approach 
is similar to the approach of Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991), who tracked 
the evolution of wage and employment inequality in the United States. We 
develop a consistent set of wage-  indexed skill categories by estimating a 
single- wage equation for 2003, conditioning it on observable characteristics. 
Given these skill prices for labor force participants, we predict wages for the 
entire population in each year from 1992 to 2003. We then rank individu-
17. The deﬁ  nition of employment is obtained by combining wage and earnings data; the basic 
strategy is explained in the appendix. The level of employment generated by this procedure is 
too low relative to the labor force surveys; however, the changes in employment correspond 
well to the labor force surveys. The reason for not using the labor force surveys at this stage is 
that we only observe foreign citizenship rather than immigrant status in these data. The pos-
sibility of standardization of the employment diﬀerentials of course is an additional virtue of 
using the microdata.
18. This is the one instance where our analysis produces something substantively diﬀerent 
than the labor force surveys. This diﬀerence may have to do with our deﬁ  nition of employment 
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als by skill (i.e., their predicted wage) and gauge the evolution of average 
wages and nonemployment within deciles of the predicted wage distribution 
over the entire period. This procedure will most likely place nonemployed 
individuals too high in the skills distribution—it overpredicts wages for non-
workers, because it ignores the role of unobserved skills—but we proceed 
with those caveats in mind.
Figure 3.8 shows real wage growth for workers in diﬀerent intervals of the 
overall wage distribution, along with growth in economy-  wide labor pro-
ductivity (output per hour). Real productivity grew by roughly 28 percent 
between 1992 and 2003, or at a compound (and stable) rate of about 2.3 
percent annually. This increase in productivity drove real wage increases of 
similar overall magnitude, but the ﬁ  gure also demonstrates that associated 
wage gains were not distributed equally across skill groups. Importantly, 
this pattern of growing real wages stands in sharp contrast to the period 
from 1975 to 1995, when real wages did not grow at all (see Edin and Topel 
1997). Wages for the most skilled individuals led the way, with an average 
annual growth of 2.7 percent, while workers from the lowest decile experi-
enced wage increases at the lower but still substantial rate of 1.7 percent per 
annum. Inequality increased—wage growth is perfectly rank ordered across 
intervals of the (predicted) wage distribution—but the data clearly indicate 
that rising productivity in the 1990s served to raise all boats.
The fact that real wages have grown for all skill groups in Sweden during 
the 1990s is in sharp contrast to the skill distribution of wage and produc-
tivity gains in the United States, where many boats were not lifted, in spite 
of similar increases in measured labor productivity and compensation per 
hour. Figure 3.9 shows the growth in average productivity per hour across 
Table 3.5  Employment diﬀerentials by observed characteristics (percentage points)
Year
    1992   1996   2000   2003
Education (relative to those with 
upper- secondary  schooling)
    Compulsory schooling or less –3.2 –8.0 –8.1 –9.5
    More than upper-  secondary school 8.4 6.5 3.8 3.8
New entrants (relative to peak wage 
earners)
–38.1 –43.5 –36.3 –39.9
Women (relative to men) –7.0 –5.3 –5.0 –4.3
Immigrants by region of origin 
(relative to native born)
  Nordic 0.3 –2.2 –2.5 –2.3
  OECD –9.2 –9.4 –7.0 –9.2
  Non-  OECD   –9.6   –15.6   –13.4   –12.7
Note: New entrants row pertains to those with zero to ﬁ  ve years of potential experience rela-
tive to those with thirty to thirty-  ﬁ  ve years of potential experienceFig. 3.8    Growth in average productivity and real wage growth by skill group (pre-
dicted wage percentile), 1992 to 2003 (1992  0)
Source: Calculations of real wage growth are based on LINDA. Productivity comes from 
Statistics Sweden and the National Institute of Economic Research
Fig. 3.9    Growth in average productivity (output/  hour) and real wage growth by 
percentile, 1963 to 2000 (1970  1)
Sources: The CPS and the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
Note: “product2”  productivity; “jw10”  10th percentile; “jw50”  50th percentile; and 
“jw95”  95th percentile.Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    1 0 5
all workers in the United States (top line), along with wage growth for the 
95th, 50th, and 10th percentiles of the wage distribution from 1963 to 2000. 
Unlike in Sweden, during the 1990s, only those at the top of the U.S. wage 
distribution experienced wage growth comparable to growth in aggregate 
real productivity. Individuals at or below the median of the U.S. wage dis-
tribution experienced negligible real wage growth during the 1990s. Some 
of this diﬀerence between productivity and wage growth reﬂ  ects growth in 
nonwage compensation in the United States—employer-  provided health 
insurance is the most obvious example—but most of the gap appears to be 
due to the growing inequality of productivities that favored wage earners at 
the highest reaches of the distribution.19
Figure 3.10 shows the evolution of nonemployment for the same skill 
categories used in ﬁ  gure 3.8. It is evident that the least skilled (p1 to p10) 
are more susceptible to economic contraction than individuals around the 
median in the skill distribution (p31 to p70). Nevertheless, the employment 
prospects for all other groups have improved since 1992. The decline in the 
employment prospects for the least skilled since 1992 relative to the change 
for the median is signiﬁ  cant at conventional levels. (The diﬀerence in the 
changes has a t-  ratio of –  9.6.) Thus, the evolution of employment rates for 
the least skilled compounds the pattern of rising inequality shown in ﬁ  gure 
3.8. In section 3.5, we pay closer attention to the employment prospects of 
the less skilled and how they are inﬂ  uenced by wage policy.
3.4      Wage Policy, Skill Formation, and Skill Allocation
Swedish wage policy, implemented by collective bargaining, clearly has 
produced a diﬀerent allocation of labor across industries and of workers 
across skills than would an unimpeded labor market. The incentives to invest 
in skills and to seek productive employment opportunities may be curbed 
by wage compression. Moreover, an explicit aim of Swedish wage policy has 
been to price some jobs out of the market. Thus, wage policy aﬀects both 
ends of the (potential) skill distribution. The purpose of the next two sec-
tions is to look more closely at these two aspects of wage policy. We begin by 
looking at how incentives to invest can aﬀect human capital formation. We 
follow by examining the eﬀects at the lower end of the skill distribution.20
Having the right incentives is obviously important in a number of ways. 
19. The wage measures for both the United States and Sweden deﬂ  ate wages by a common 
price index for all skill groups. In the United States, this overstates change in relative welfare, 
because prices have risen less rapidly for goods purchased by low-  income families. See Broda 
and Romalis (2008).
20. Throughout, we focus on wage policy and how it may inﬂ  uence wage returns and employ-
ment outcomes. Obviously, other institutional arrangements are also important if we want 
to understand the full diﬀerence between the employment rates, for example, of natives and 
immigrants. Note also that our basic approach is the narrative—establishing causality is a 
much more diﬃcult issue.106        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
They are essential for the acquisition of the (right) skills; they inﬂ  uence labor 
supply and are conducive for using the acquired skills in the most valuable 
way. Further, international migration is also aﬀected by the return to skills. 
Measuring these various dimensions of the relationship between incentives 
and skills is of course diﬃcult. But some aspects—such as the association 
between the returns to education and enrollment—are measurable.
In ﬁ  gures 3.11 and 3.12, we examine the relationship between the returns 
to university education and the university enrollment rate in Sweden and 
the United States, respectively. These graphs are constructed in a slightly 
diﬀerent fashion—for Sweden, we report the fraction of the population aged 
nineteen to twenty-  one attending universities, while for the United States, 
we show the fraction of high school graduates attending college—but the 
spirit of the calculations is the same.
Both ﬁ  gures convey the message that investments in this form of human 
capital respond to changes in the returns on such investments. Figure 3.11 
shows two swings in the Swedish data. The returns to university educa-
tion declined by roughly half—from 10.6 percent to 5.2 percent per year—
between the early 1970s and the mid-  1980s, concomitant with the decline 
in overall wage inequality in Sweden. Then, the return rebounded; by 2003, 
it had risen to about 8 percent. Importantly, the university enrollment rate 
mirrors this development, declining as the ﬁ  nancial rewards to schooling fell 
and increasing as those returns subsequently rose.
This connection between rates of return and investment in human capi-
tal is also evident in the United States. Figure 3.12 shows corresponding 
Fig. 3.10    Nonemployment by skill group, 1992 to 2003 (1992  0)
Source: Calculations based on LINDA.Fig. 3.11    Returns to university and the university enrollment rate (share of popula-
tion) in Sweden, 1968 to 2003
Sources: Education and population statistics from Statistics Sweden (enrollment rate), and 
estimates based on LINDA (wage return).
Notes: The university enrollment rate is the number of university students less than twenty-
two years of age as a fraction of the population aged nineteen to twenty-one. We have adjusted 
these data for the reform of university education in 1977. The return is measured in logs and 
is deﬁ  ned per year of university education. The return has been imputed using earnings regres-
sions for years prior to 1992.
Fig. 3.12    Returns to college and the college enrollment rate (share of high school 
graduates) in the United States, 1963 to 2001
Source: Calculations based on the CPS.108        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
patterns for investment and returns in the United States from 1963 onward. 
Here, the measurement of schooling investment is the fraction of high 
school graduates from a given cohort who report at least one year of col-
lege education. Figure 3.12 is slightly more compelling than ﬁ  gure 3.11, 
as in the United States, there is greater variation in the rate of return over 
time. The U.S. return per year of college bottomed out at about 7 percent in 
1979, having declined by 5 percentage points since 1968. This corresponds 
closely with the trough in the fraction of eligible high school graduates with 
college training, which declined to 41 percent for the 1978/  1979 cohorts of 
high school graduates. Then, the returns doubled to about 14 percent in the 
1990s—far above anything observed in Sweden—which lines up with a 13 
percentage point increase (from 41 percent to 54 percent) in the fraction 
of high school graduates who have completed some college. The implied 
elasticity of U.S. human capital investment with respect to the Mincerian 
return is about 0.40.
The evidence in ﬁ  gures 3.11 and 3.12 has important implications for 
Swedish productivity and economic growth. Egalitarian policies—which 
range from wage- bargaining institutions to redistributive taxes and publicly 
provided consumption—clearly compress wage, income, and consumption 
diﬀerences across skill groups. These diﬀerences are the returns to investing 
in productive skills, so the evidence is that wage compression impedes human 
capital formation. If we take the U.S. schooling data seriously, the elasticity 
of human capital with respect to wage returns is substantial. We have no 
evidence on how these policies aﬀect investments in other forms of human 
capital, such as occupational choice, job- speciﬁ  c training, and the accumula-
tion of other postschooling skills, but neither do we have reason to believe 
that these investments would respond diﬀerently than does schooling.
How large might be the eﬀects of a slight increase in wage inequality on 
long-  run productivity and welfare? Consistent with U.S. data, we assume 
the elasticity of human capital investment with respect to its return is 0.4. 
In Sweden today, the log of the 90/  10 wage diﬀerential is about 0.70 (see 
ﬁ  gure 3.5), which, as we have noted, implies that a 90th-  percentile Swede 
earns about double the wage of a Swede at the 10th percentile of the wage 
distribution. Reasonably, Swedish wage-  setting and other institutions have 
compressed these returns to skill. Suppose that restrictions on wage setting 
were relaxed in such a way that the log 90/  10 diﬀerential increased from 0.7 
to 0.8, for an earnings ratio of 2.23. Few would argue that such a change has 
a major impact on egalitarian outcomes. This change implies a 14.3 percent 
(0.10/ 0.70   0.143) relative change in inequality.
Now suppose that the returns to skill rise in the same proportion. With 
a long-  run elasticity of investment in human capital of 0.40, this yields 
a long-  run change in the aggregate human capital stock of 5.7 percent 
(0.143  0.40  0.057). In modern theories of economic growth, long-  run 
productivity is proportional to human capital, so this change yields a per-Wage Determination and Employment in Sweden Since the Early 1990s    1 0 9
manent increase in national income of 5.7 percent. We are not expecting 
anyone to take the exact number very seriously. Still, this calculation indi-
cates that there may be large gains from relaxing institutional restrictions 
on wage setting. (In other words, the eﬃciency costs of egalitarian policies 
may be quite large.)
Another dimension of economy- wide human capital formation concerns 
the skill content of international migration. While it is true that international 
migration ﬂ  ows are pretty low at present, even small ﬂ  ows may be a problem 
if the most talented leave the country. Moreover, international migration 
may be an increasingly important phenomenon as world market integration 
progresses.
Basic human capital theory suggests that high-  ability immigrants should 
be attracted to countries that have more wage dispersion and greater returns 
to skills. This prediction is largely conﬁ  rmed by comparing the immigration 
experiences of the United States and the European Union as a whole (see 
Wasmer et al. 2007). Figures 3.13 and 3.14 examine this issue in the context 
of Swedish/  U.S. immigration ﬂ  ows. The ﬁ  gures show immigrant shares by 
percentiles of the wage distribution in the two countries. Immigrants to 
Sweden—see ﬁ  gure 3.13—are concentrated in the lower part of the wage 
distribution. Splitting the data by broad regions of origin, we see that this 
low-  skill concentration is entirely due to non-  OECD (refugee) immigrants 
being more prevalent at the lower end of the wage distribution; immigrants 
from Nordic and OECD countries are broadly distributed in the same way 
as native Swedes.
Figure 3.14 shows an analogous plot for the United States. In contrast 
to the low-  skill concentration of Swedish immigrants, in the United States, 
immigrants are more prevalent at both extremes of the wage distribution. 
Splitting the data by ethnic origin (not shown) demonstrates that Asians are 
about as likely to be at the top as at the bottom of the wage distribution in 
the United States, while Hispanics look more like non-  OECD immigrants 
to Sweden.
Given the nature of the recent immigrant inﬂ  ow to Sweden, it is poten-
tially misleading to compare Sweden and the United States without adjust-
ing for the fact that the source countries are diﬀerent, as are the reasons for 
immigration. The possible connection between skill content of immigration 
and the returns to skill is likely to be substantially weaker among refugee 
immigrants. To obtain a sharper comparison, we focus on immigrants from 
OECD-  Europe (excluding the Nordic countries).21 Notice that the distri-
bution over source countries within this immigrant group is very similar 
21. The reason for excluding the Nordic countries is that gravity is likely to be an issue here. 
Presumably, it is a much bigger step to move to the United States than to Sweden for Nordic 
immigrants. For analogous (but converse) reasons, we do not want to include immigrants from 
Central and South America in the comparison, who have much stronger ties to the United 
States.Fig. 3.13    Immigrants by wage percentile in Sweden, 2003
Source: Calculations based on LINDA.
Fig. 3.14    Immigrants by wage percentile in the United States, 1999
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in the United States and Sweden, so such diﬀerences will not inﬂ  uence our 
comparisons.
In ﬁ  gure 3.15, we compare the distribution of OECD-  European immi-
grants in the Swedish and U.S. wage distributions, respectively. While immi-
grants to Sweden from OECD-  Europe are distributed roughly in the same 
way as native Swedes, the salient fact in the United States is that OECD 
immigrants are disproportionately high skilled, as indicated by market 
wages. Figure 3.16 further develops this point, comparing the ranking of 
immigrants from Nordic countries with the ranking of immigrants from 
OECD- Europe within the U.S. wage distribution. To smooth the data some-
what, we now show the cumulative fraction of immigrants at each percentile 
of the U.S. wage distribution—a sort of relative Lorenz curve.22 Our ﬁ  nding 
is that Nordic immigrants to the United States are more heavily concentrated 
at the high end of the U.S. wage distribution than are other European immi-
grants. Most of this diﬀerence is above the 90th percentile—that is, Nordic 
immigrants to the United States are disproportionately concentrated in the 
upper decile of the U.S. wage distribution, where the returns to skill are 
much higher than in their home countries.
The question, then, is how we should interpret ﬁ  gures 3.15 and 3.16. One 
interpretation is that there is self-  selection in the immigrant pool, and tal-
ented Europeans are attracted to the United States because of higher returns 
to skill (see ﬁ  gure 3.15). On this interpretation, the greater concentration 
of Scandinavian immigrants at the top of the U.S. wage distribution is due 
to greater returns to migration among the most talented, as wage distribu-
tions in their home countries are particularly compressed, even by European 
standards (see ﬁ  gure 3.16). There is a European brain drain to the United 
States, and the eﬀects are most pronounced in Nordic countries, where wage 
compression is most severe.
Against this, one might argue that the average native- born Swede is more 
skilled than the average native-  born American, so a given immigrant will 
have a lower rank in the Swedish than in the U.S. wage distribution. That 
there is some truth to this story is suggested by the IALS data (see OECD 
and Statistics Canada 1995). Among the countries listed in table 3.6, Swe-
den has the highest mean score, while the mean score in the United States 
is slightly below the other Nordic countries. The table also shows that an 
immigrant for any given OECD country would rank lower in the Swedish 
skill distribution than in the U.S. one.
So, let us narrow the comparison even more to try to separate the two 
explanations. In ﬁ  gure 3.17, we compare Nordic immigrants in the United 
States with German immigrants. We select German immigrants as the 
22. There were not enough observations on Swedish immigrants (eighty) to do a reliable 
comparison, so Nordic countries include Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, yielding 
204 immigrants. Non- Nordic countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.Fig. 3.16    Cumulative wage distributions of Nordic and other OECD-  Europe immi-
grants by percentile of U.S. wage distribution
Source: Census PUMS, 1999.
Note: “cumeur”  OECD-  Europe and “cumnor”  Nordic.
Fig. 3.15    The share of immigrants from OECD-  Europe by wage percentile in the 
Swedish and U.S. wage distributions
Sources: Calculations based on LINDA (Sweden, 2003) and the U.S. Census Bureau Public- 
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comparison because they are most similar to Nordic immigrants—mean 
skills as measured by the IALS are only slightly below the averages in Fin-
land and Denmark.
The conclusion is very similar to the one obtained from ﬁ  gure 3.16. Nor-
dic immigrants in the United States are concentrated much more at the top 
of the U.S. wage distribution than are German immigrants. The evidence 
Table 3.6  Test scores according to the International Adult Literacy Survey
  Country   Mean  
Rank in Swedish 
distribution  
Rank in U.S. 
distribution  
Belgium 279 30 48
Denmark 289 37 56
Finland 289 37 56
Germany 287 36 55
Ireland 262 20 37
Italy 244 13 26
The Netherlands 288 36 55
Norway 296 43 62
Sweden 308 n.a. 69
Switzerland 285 34 53
United Kingdom 270 24 42
  United States   284   33   n.a.  
Notes: The sample pertains to natives aged sixteen to sixty-  ﬁ  ve in the respective countries. 
Sampling weights are used; “n.a.” means not applicable.
Fig. 3.17    Cumulative wage distributions of Nordic and German immigrants by 
percentile of U.S. wage distribution
Source: Census PUMS, 1999.
Note: “cumeur”  OECD-  Europe and “cumnor”  Nordic.114        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
suggests that wage compression provides the strongest incentives to the most 
talented Swedes to migrate—a version of the brain drain—and that Sweden 
is relatively more attractive to less-  skilled migrants. These eﬀects on the 
composition of migrants are probably not alarming at present but may be 
a more pressing concern in the near future.
Another margin where wage policies may aﬀect skill allocation concerns 
the utilization of human capital. The total amount of time spent in market 
work is substantially lower in Sweden (and in any other European country) 
than in the United States. In 2004, the average employee worked 1,585 hours 
per year in Sweden; the corresponding American worked 1,825 hours.23 But 
if one compares the total amount of work—that is, the sum of market work 
and time spent doing household work—there is no diﬀerence across the two 
countries (Olovsson 2004). Diﬀerent incentives thus imply that Swedes allo-
cate less time to market activities—further evidence that welfare state poli-
cies distort incentives relative to unimpeded market outcomes. Of course, 
also in this instance, other features of the welfare state are relevant, as the 
total wedge between market and household activities is inﬂ  uenced by income 
taxes and transfers as well.
3.5      Wage Policy and Its Eﬀects on Less-  Skilled Workers
The fact that the total amount of work—particularly for females—is 
similar in Europe and the United States is consistent with the marketization 
hypothesis of Freeman and Schettkat (2005). The essence of their argument 
is that most European countries have wage- setting frameworks that include 
both a greater role for collective bargaining and higher payroll taxes than in 
the United States. This combination has raised the price of services that are 
intensive in low-  skilled labor, so Europeans have lower market consump-
tion of these services than do Americans. Freeman and Schettkat go on 
to argue that increased marketization of services would free up more time 
for women to engage fully in market activities and to make full use of their 
human capital investments. But this would require some relaxation of wage 
restraints among the least skilled.
Female employment rates in Sweden are closer to those in the United 
States than in continental Europe. An important reason for this is that ser-
vices such as child care (see Kolm and Lazear, chapter 2 in this volume) and 
elderly care are publicly provided in Sweden rather than produced by the 
market and the household—as in the United States—or predominantly by 
the household—as in Germany. Nevertheless, some services, such as cook-
ing and cleaning, are still home produced to a greater extent in Sweden 
than in United States. These facts imply that the private-  service sector will 
be smaller in Sweden than in the United States—and it is (see table 3.7). 
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Of course, the distribution of employment over industries is diﬀerent in 
Sweden than in the United States for a variety of reasons. The ﬁ  rst ques-
tion we take up (section 3.5.1) is whether relative industry size is related to 
the employment prospects of workers with diﬀerent skills. For instance, 
one may suspect that the employment opportunities of immigrants—who 
are disproportionately employed in low-  wage services in all industrialized 
countries—are worse in a country where services are produced in the market 
to a lesser extent.
The distribution of industry employment in a given country depends on 
the entire institutional setup in that country. In addition to wage policy, tax 
and industrial policies have eﬀects on the services and goods produced in the 
market (see Davis and Henrekson, chapter 7 in this volume). In section 3.5.2, 
therefore, we look directly at wage policies that are aﬀecting the lower end 
of the skill distribution, with a focus on the impact of negotiated minimum 
wages on employment.
3.5.1      Industry Size and Employment of the Least Skilled
In 2000, the employment-  to-  population ratio of native Swedes was 17.6 
percentage points higher than for immigrants. In the United States, the 
employment-  to-  population ratio of immigrants is slightly higher than for 
natives. A possible explanation for this gap is that the Swedish labor market 
oﬀers scant employment opportunities for immigrants, especially less- skilled 
recent immigrants. Table 3.7 sheds light on this question by using the U.S. 
distribution of employment across broad industry categories as the coun-
terfactual. In other words, we ask: if industry employment shares in Sweden 
were like those in the United States, what would happen to the demand for 
immigrant labor in Sweden? Would employment opportunities improve? We 
impute the immigrant distribution over industries using the U.S. distribution 
of industry employment, taking as given the concentration of immigrants 
in Swedish industries.
The ﬁ  rst two columns report the distribution of employment in the over-
all population for the United States and Sweden, respectively. The share 
of manufacturing is smaller in the United States than in Sweden, while 
private services, in general, employ a greater fraction of individuals in the 
United States. The third column reports the distribution of employed immi-
grants in Sweden. Compared to Swedish natives and to the U.S. labor force, 
Swedish immigrants are disproportionately employed in manufacturing. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, they are about as prevalent in trade, hotels, 
and restaurants as is the overall population. However, this simply is due to 
the aggregation of retail and wholesale trade and hotels and restaurants. 
A ﬁ  ner division of the data by industry also reveals that they are much 
more prevalent in hotels and restaurants but are less prevalent in retail and 
wholesale trade.
For the broad categories used in this calculation, the two industries that 116        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
account for the largest shares of Swedish immigrant jobs (manufacturing 
and community and personal services) are smaller in the United States 
than in Sweden. So, a shift to the U.S. distribution of industry employment 
would reduce the immigrant employment rate, holding constant the rela-
tive distribution of immigrants across industries. Immigrant employment 
would be reduced by 1.5 percent in this conceptual experiment—see column 
(4)—increasing the immigrant/ native gap in the employment- to- population 
ratio to 18.3 percentage points. Having said this, we should note that this 
result is partly an artifact of the one-  digit industry classiﬁ  cations used in 
table 3.7, which may mask the expansion of employment opportunities for 
immigrants.
The last two columns of the table report the results of an analogous exer-
cise for individuals who are predicted to have a low wage. Column (5) thus 
reports the actual distribution of employment over industries for individuals 
that are predicted to be in the lowest quartile of the wage distribution. A 












(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
Agriculture, forestry, and 
ﬁ  shing
2.4 2.7 1.3 1.2 2.3 2.0
Mining and quarrying 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Manufacturing 12.6 17.5 22.7 16.3 16.7 12.0
Power and water plants 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Construction 5.7 5.2 2.7 2.9 2.1 2.3
Retail and wholesale trade; 
hotels and restaurants
24.7 15.5 15.6 24.9 25.1 40.0
Transport and 
communication
5.1 7 7.0 5.1 5.3 3.9
Finance, insurance, and 
real estate
16.8 13.4 13.1 16.4 11.9 14.9
Community and personal 
services
31.8 37.8 37.3 31.4 36.2 30.5
Total   100.1   100.0   100.0   98.5   100.0   106.0
Source: Calculations based on the OECD STructural ANalysis database (STAN) and LINDA.
Notes: The numbers in column (4) are calculated as column (4)  [column (3)/column (2)] ∗ column (1). 
The numbers in column (6) are calculated in an analogous fashion. Lowest quartile columns pertain to 
individuals who are in the lowest quartile of the predicted wage distribution. This wage prediction was 
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comparison of columns (5) and (2) reveals that the major diﬀerence between 
these individuals and the overall population is that they are more likely to be 
employed in retail and wholesale trade and in hotels and restaurants relative 
to the overall population. The U.S. distribution of industry employment 
thus implies an increase in the employment rate for low-  wage individuals. 
The U.S. counterfactual suggests that the employment-  to-  population ratio 
would increase by 6 percent, which would contribute to a decrease of the 
employment gap by almost 3 percentage points—from 22.9 to 20.1 percent-
age points—though we put more stock in the direction of this eﬀect than in 
the particular magnitude estimated in this illustrative exercise.
3.5.2      Minimum Wages and Employment
As we noted earlier, minimum wages in Sweden are determined by the 
collective-  bargaining process rather than by legislation; there is no legal 
minimum wage, though negotiated minima also apply to nonunion employ-
ees if there is a collective agreement at the workplace. So, minimum wages 
generally will vary by industry, as well as by age, occupation, and experience. 
And by most standards, they are high.
Table 3.8 shows the minimum wage bite by country in 2004, deﬁ  ned as 
the minimum wage divided by the median wage in manufacturing in each 
country.24 Apart from Sweden, all countries reported in table 3.8 have legis-
lated minimum wages. For Sweden, we report a range, because the minimum 
wage varies across collective-  bargaining agreements. Among the countries 
covered in table 3.8, Sweden has the highest minimum wage bite. This re-
ﬂ  ects what seems to be an empirical regularity—minimum wages tend to 
be higher when they are subject to bargaining rather than to legislation. In 
2001, minimum wages in Norway and Denmark were higher than in Sweden, 
while Finland’s was slightly lower, and Germany’s was much lower (Anders-
son, Kainelainen, and Reinbrand 2002).25 Thus, the Nordic countries share 
the feature of having high minimum wages, just as they share many other 
features concerning wage dispersion and institutions.
Figure 3.18 tracks the evolution of Sweden’s minimum wage bite, deﬁ  ned 
here as the minimum wage relative to the mean wage in each industry, since 
1991 for a collection of industries. It is evident that the bite of the mini-
mum wage is higher in the service sectors than in manufacturing, reﬂ  ecting 
lower average wages in services. From 1994 to 2004, the minimum wage bite 
declined by roughly 8 percentage points (to 63 percent) in manufacturing. In 
24. Much of the information on minimum wages in this section comes from Per Skedinger. 
We have also obtained some information on minimum wages from Albin Kainelainen. We 
thank them for supplying the data.
25. For countries with bargained minimum wages, Andersson, Kainelainen, and Reinbrand 
(2002) look at the minimum wage for dishwashers and relate that to the mean manufacturing 
wage. In 2001, the minimum wage bite deﬁ  ned in this way was close to 70 percent in Norway, 
slightly above 60 percent in Denmark, 60 percent in Sweden, roughly 55 percent in Finland, 
and 40 percent in Germany.Table 3.8  Minimum wage bite by country in 2004














  United States   32  
Source: Low Pay Commission (2005).
Notes: The minimum wage bite is deﬁ  ned as the minimum wage relative to the median manu-
facturing wage in each country. For the United States, we report the federal minimum wage; 
the number for Canada refers to a weighted average across regions.
Fig. 3.18    Minimum wage bite for a selection of industries, 1991–  2004 (%)
Source: Skedinger (2006b). Minimum wages come from the various wage settlements. Average 
wages pertain to unskilled workers and come from Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Mu-
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private services, on the other hand, the wage bite has been roughly constant 
(retail trade) or has increased (hotels and restaurants). It is clear that mini-
mum wages have signiﬁ  cant bite in hotels and restaurants—the bargained 
minimum stood at 85 percent of the average wage by 2003—so for practical 
purposes, the minimum contractual wage compresses the wage distribution 
in this sector substantially from below.
Of course, minimum wages have diﬀerential bite for various worker cat-
egories. Table 3.9 illustrates this by showing the minimum wage as a per-
centage of the mean wage for the native born, for the native born aged 
twenty to twenty-  ﬁ  ve, and for immigrants. Here, we focus on a single wage 
agreement—that pertaining to blue- collar workers in the local public sector. 
Minimum wages have substantial bite in these blue-  collar occupations. The 
minimum wage bite varies in a rather obvious way across worker categories: 
immigrants and youths have lower wages than the average native born, and 
hence, the minimum wage amounts to a greater fraction of the mean wages 
of these two groups.
The interesting question is whether minimum wages reduce the employ-
ment prospects of the less skilled. This is a controversial issue in the empiri-
cal literature on minimum wages,26 yet evidence from Sweden indicates a 
substantial eﬀect. Edin and Holmlund (1994) used time series data to exam-
ine whether youth employment in manufacturing is related to the minimum 
wage bite. They found that the minimum wage is negatively related to youth 
employment. Skedinger (2006a) studied the consequences of minimum 
wages in hotels and restaurants, using individual wage and employment 
data. This allowed Skedinger to isolate those workers who were most likely 
to be aﬀected by minimum wage changes. He then related the wage and 
employment experiences of this group to the experiences of a comparison 
group consisting of individuals with similar wages initially but who were less 
aﬀected by minimum wage changes.27 Like Edin and Holmlund, Skedinger 
also found negative employment eﬀects of increases in the minimum wage, 
and the eﬀect is substantial. His baseline estimates indicate that a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage reduced the relative employment rates of 
aﬀected workers by 5 percent—a demand elasticity of about –  0.5 among 
low- skill  workers.
We previously noted that the employment-  to-  population ratio among 
immigrants is 17.6 points lower among Swedish immigrants than among 
natives, but in the United States, these ratios are roughly comparable. Given 
a demand elasticity of –  0.5, it is reasonable to conclude that some of this 
immigrant/  native employment gap in Sweden would close if bargained 
26. In some notable examples, increases in minimum wages even have positive employment 
eﬀects; see Card and Krueger (1995).
27. Of course, there is considerable diﬃculty in ﬁ  nding a comparison group that was not 
treated by the minimum wage. Most realistic theories predict that minimum wage changes will 
aﬀect the entire wage distribution.120        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
minimum wages in Sweden were to decline. It is highly unlikely, however, that 
the immigrant/ native employment gap would disappear completely, as in the 
U.S. case, because the characteristics of the Swedish and U.S. immigrant 
populations are very diﬀerent.
3.6    Conclusions
The original SNS-  NBER study of the Swedish labor market was writ-
ten in the midst of the economic crisis of the early 1990s. In this sequel, we 
have focused on the postcrisis performance of the labor market, emphasiz-
ing institutional and other changes that have aﬀected wage determination, 
inequality, and employment. Our major conclusions are as follows:
1.  Changes in wage determination. The institutional features of wage deter-
mination have changed since the beginning of the 1990s. The advent of the 
industrial agreement—and similar agreements in other sectors—appears to 
have reduced aggregate wage pressure. However, the impact of these agree-
ments on the wage structure is likely to be limited. Wage diﬀerentials are 
more inﬂ  uenced by the decline of centralized bargaining and the consequent 
decentralization of negotiated wages. The tide toward decentralization is 
most evident among white-  collar workers. Changes in the wage determina-
tion process for blue-  collar workers are more minor. Bargained minimum 
wages are as prevalent as earlier, and the growth of minimum wages is largely 
on par with the growth of average wages. As a result, wage compression at 
the bottom of the skill distribution remains important.
2.  Changes in wage diﬀerentials. Consistent with trends in other indus-
trialized countries, wage dispersion in Sweden has increased since the early 
1990s. This increase was concentrated among white-  collar workers and in 
the upper tail of the wage distribution. The return to education and the 
wage gap between refugee immigrants and natives rose as well, indicating 
Table 3.9  Minimum wage bite by worker category, local public sector in 2003





Aged 20 to 25, unskilled 83
  Aged 20 to 25, semiskilled  79  
Source: Calculations based on LINDA.
Notes: Unskilled occupations have no educational requirements. Semiskilled occupations 
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that Sweden’s modest move toward greater inequality reﬂ  ects rising returns 
to human capital. Decentralization of wage determination probably has 
contributed to greater wage disparities, but decentralization may also be 
an eﬀect, rather than a cause, of rising inequality. As argued by Edin and 
Topel (1997), rising returns to skill increased the distortions of centralized 
bargaining and likely prompted its demise. Decentralized wage setting added 
a layer of ﬂ  exibility that better reﬂ  ects market realities.
3.  Wage policy and eﬃciency. In an unregulated market, the wage has an 
important allocative role. For instance, regional wage diﬀerences contribute 
to mobility, and skill diﬀerences in wages are the ﬁ  nancial returns for acquir-
ing human capital. Consistent with the latter eﬀect, we have shown that 
university enrollment is positively associated with the return to education 
in both Sweden and the United States, indicating that a cost of Sweden’s 
egalitarian policies may be to dampen investment in human capital. Simi-
larly, we ﬁ  nd that migrants from Sweden are likely to be highly skilled, while 
recent immigrants are concentrated heavily at the lower end of the Swedish 
skill distribution. All of this suggests dampened growth of human capital, 
which may have long-  term eﬀects on living standards.
4.  Wage policy and distribution. Productivity growth has been high in 
Sweden since the beginning of the 1990s. Some of this reﬂ  ects a recovery 
from crisis, but the evidence also suggests an improvement in long-  term 
economic growth. Unlike the U.S. experience, where productivity growth 
appears to have been concentrated mainly among the most skilled, Sweden’s 
productivity gains in the 1990s were more equally (though not equally) dis-
tributed across wage and income categories. It seems highly likely that this 
diﬀerence across the two countries is at least partly due to the diﬀerence in 
wage-  setting institutions and other redistributive policies. But it also seems 
implausible that the gains that have accrued mainly to the most highly paid 
in the United States would have gone to others if American wage-  setting 
institutions were diﬀerent—it is also a matter of whose productivity has 
risen.
5.  Wage policy and employment. Since the early 1990s, employment 
growth has been lower than average for those with the weakest position in 
the labor market. It is diﬃcult tell to what extent this is due to wage policy. 
But wage policy has contributed to a diﬀerent industrial structure in Sweden 
than in the United States. If Sweden’s industrial structure would become 
more similar to the United States, employment prospects for the least skilled 
would improve. Minimum wages are likely to have especially hampered 
the employment prospects of immigrants and youths. These pressures are 
unlikely to abate, given the character of Sweden’s recent immigration experi-
ence and the possibility of rising immigrant ﬂ  ows in the future. In this light, 
the employment distortions of minimum wages are likely to be greater today 
than earlier and possibly greater in the future than at present.122        Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel
What can we take from this evidence? Ten years ago, in the midst of 
economic crisis, it was plausible to argue that a bit more inequality in wage 
outcomes would be a small price to pay for long-  term improvements in 
economic performance. Whether causally or coincidentally, inequality in 
Sweden has risen, and economic performance has improved. But by almost 
any standard, inequality in Sweden remains remarkably low. Is the same 
prescription warranted today as ten years ago? In some part, this is a matter 
of values. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the market realities are push-
ing toward increasing wage diﬀerentials. In this environment, a given set 
of egalitarian outcomes will cause greater eﬃciency losses today than ten 
years ago.
What kinds of policy levers are available if one believes, for example, that 
minimum wages distort more today than ten or twenty years ago? Wage 
policy is in part a misnomer: it is not directly a tool of government eco-
nomic policies. It reﬂ  ects Sweden’s collective bargaining institutions, and 
these are unlikely to change rapidly, if at all. But relevant wage diﬀerences 
for the most part are after tax and after transfers, which leaves some leverage 
for policy adjustments that could improve labor market performance and 
increase prosperity in Sweden.
Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to describe our data construction eﬀorts 
in more detail. Our data come from LINDA (see Edin and Fredriksson 
2000). Throughout, we sample employees aged twenty to sixty-  four whose 
educational attainment is not missing.
Weighting
The collection of the wage data has varied over time. Prior to 1998, the 
data have been collected by stratiﬁ  ed sampling of the employed in the private 
sector. From 1998 and onward, the wage data are representative for the 
employed population.
When data were collected by stratiﬁ  ed sampling, small ﬁ  rms were sam-
pled with low probability (0.02 for ﬁ  rms with less than ten employees), and 
the sampling probability increased with ﬁ  rm size. (It is unity for ﬁ  rms with 
more than 500 employees.) Unfortunately, there is no information on the 
individual sampling probability in the data. However, we know the ﬁ  rm 
size distribution in each industry. Using these data together with the sam-
pling probabilities, we calculate the average sampling probability for each 
two-  digit industry. Pre-  1998 private-  sector data thus are weighted by the 
inverse of the sampling probability by industry to obtain estimates that 
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delivered sensible results, we used data from 2003. In the 2003 data, we know 
who would have been sampled under stratiﬁ  ed sampling. Assuming that the 
diﬀerence in sampling procedure has a proportional eﬀect on the measured 
standard deviation (for all years), we can calculate the adjustment neces-
sary to go from the representative population to the population obtained 
by stratiﬁ  ed sampling. Figure 3A.1 shows the standard deviation of the log 
wage distribution for diﬀerent ways of adjusting the pre-  1998 data. The 
line labeled “adjusted” reports the standard deviation obtained using this 
adjustment, and the line labeled “weighted” reports the estimated standard 
deviation using our weighting strategy. As shown by the ﬁ  gure, these two 
estimates more or less go together.
Trimming
In the wage data, there were some (albeit very few) obvious measurement 
errors in the lower tail of the wage distribution. Therefore, we trimmed the 
lower tail of the wage distribution by deleting those earning less than 17.45 
SEK per hour (roughly $2.2 an hour at the 2005 SEK/  dollar conversion 
rate). This had the eﬀect of deleting 121 individuals in 1999 and less than 
ﬁ  ve for all other years.
Years of Schooling
We have imputed years of schooling from attainment data. The attain-
ment data come from registers that record the degrees of the individuals. 
This education register gradually has become more informative over time; 
in later years, it includes adult education and courses taken at the university 
level. The latest versions of the education register include measures of the 
Fig. 3A.1    Standard deviation of log wages, diﬀerent ways of adjusting pre-  1998 
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normal time to degree for all attainment levels. For all years, there is also 
information on when the degree was obtained. We opt for an algorithm, 
where we assign the most informative measures of education also for the 
earlier years when it is obvious that the individual has not upgraded his or 
her education between these two time points.
Employment
We deﬁ  ne employment on the basis of earnings data. Rather than opting 
for a single earnings limit applied to all individuals for each year, we calcu-
late separate earnings limits for thirty-  two cells based on gender, schooling, 
region, of origin, and experience. The reason for having several thresholds 
is that we wanted to avoid having all high-  wage individuals automatically 
classiﬁ  ed as employed. The exact procedure was the following: for each year, 
we divided the wage data into thirty-  two cells based on gender, schooling, 
region of origin, and experience. Then, we identiﬁ  ed the wages of the indi-
viduals on the 1st percentile and the 10th percentile for each cell, and we 
calculated average earnings for individuals within the interval deﬁ  ned by the 
ﬁ  rst to the 10th percentile. All individuals with earnings above this threshold 
in each cell are deﬁ  ned as employed. The level of employment generated by 
this procedure diﬀers somewhat from the one reported in the Labor Force 
Survey. But the evolution of employment over time corresponds reasonably 
well to the labor force surveys; see ﬁ  gure 3A.2.
Fig.  3A.2  Diﬀerent deﬁ  nitions of employment
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